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In spite of its predominant economic weight in developing countries, little is known about 
informal sector income dynamics vis-à-vis the formal sector. Some works have been done in 
this field using household surveys, but they only consider some emerging Latin American 
countries and a few African countries. As a matter of consequence, there is still no way to 
generalize the (diverging) results to other part of the developing world. Taking advantage of 
the rich VHLSS dataset in Vietnam, in particular its three waves panel data (2002, 2004, 
2006), we assess the magnitude of various formal/informal earnings gaps while addressing 
heterogeneity issues at three different levels: the worker, the job (wage employment vs. self-
employment)  and  the  earnings  distribution.We  estimate  fixed  effects  and  quantile 
regressions to control for unobserved individual characteristics. Our results suggest that the 
informal sector earnings gap highly depends on the workers’ job status  and on their relative 
position in the earnings distribution. Penalties may in some cases turn into premiums. By 
comparing  our  results  with  studies  in  other  developing  countries,  we  draw  conclusions 
highlighting the Vietnam’s labour market specificity. 
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1.  Introduction 
In spite of its predominant economic weight in developing countries, little is known about 
the informal sector's income dynamics vis-à-vis the formal sector. Some works have been 
done in this field using household surveys, but they only consider some emerging Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico; Gong et al., 2004; Perry et 
al., 2007; Bargain et Kwenda, 2010) and more recently South Africa, Ghana and Tanzania 
for Africa (Falco et al., 2010). As a matter of consequence, there is still no way to generalize 
these (diverging) results to other parts of the developing world, in particular in countries 
where the informal sector is the most widespread (Sub-Saharan African, and more generally 
poor countries). 
From a labour market perspective, two competing views regarding informality are at stake in 
the  literature:  the  exclusion  and  the  exit  hypotheses,  following  Hirschman  masterpiece 
(Perry et al., 2007). The first one, also called the “dualist approach”, is an extension of the 
works by Lewis (1954) and Harris and Todaro (1970). It is based on a dual labour market 
model where the informal sector is considered as a residual component of this market totally 
unrelated to the formal economy. It is a subsistence economy that only exists because the 
formal economy is incapable of providing enough jobs, condemned to disappear with the 
development process. Informal workers, suffering from poor labour conditions, are queuing 
for better jobs in the formal sector. The second one, also known as the “legalist approach” 
considers that the informal sector is made up of micro-entrepreneurs who prefer to operate 
informally to evade the economic regulations (de Soto, 1989); this conservative school of 
thought is in sharp contrast to the former in that the choice of informality is voluntary due to 
the exorbitant legalisation costs associated with formal status and registration. 
Recent empirical evidence shows, however, that the real situation is a mix of these two 
hypotheses.  Confirming  Field’s  stylized  assessment  (1990),  they  stressed  the  huge 
heterogeneity among informal jobs, which combine two main components (Roubaud, 1994; 
Maloney, 1999, 2004; Perry et al., 2007; Bargain and Kwenda, 2010): a lower-tier segment, 
where occupying an informal job is a constraint choice (exclusion hypothesis); an upper-tier 
segment, in which informal jobs are chosen for better earnings, and non-pecuniary benefits 
(exit hypothesis). Usually, the former segment is assimilated to the informal wage jobs, 
while the latter is associated with the self-employed jobs. Therefore, whether one segment is 
predominant over the other is an empirical question, depending on local circumstances. To 
test  these  alternative  views,  one  major  strand  of  literature  focuses  on  the  estimation  of 
earning gaps. Embedded in reveled preferences principle, and considering income as a proxy 
of individual utility, the approach assumes that if informal workers earn more than their 
formal  counterparts  (controlling  for  observed  and  unobserved  characteristics),  one  could 
have good presumptions that they have deliberately chosen the informal sector. This may 
not be true for all informal workers. Thus, the challenge is to identify segments of jobs (for 
instance by job status) or position in the income distribution where informal workers get a 3 
 
higher pay. In this paper, our objective is to shed light on these alternative views in the case 
of Vietnam using the formal/informal earning gaps approach. We take advantage of the rich 
VHLSS dataset in Vietnam (a LSMS type household survey), in particular its three-wave 
panel  data  (2002-2004-2006),  to  ask  the  following  questions:  Is  there  an  informal  job 
earnings penalty? Do some informal jobs provide pecuniary premiums?  Which ones? Do 
possible gaps vary along the earnings distribution? 
The case of Vietnam is interesting because it has experienced spectacular social, economic 
and political changes in the recent period. Impressive economic growth of the last decade 
has  entailed  a  remarkable  drop  in  poverty  figures,  drastic  changes  of  the  labour  market 
structure, but also a surge in earnings inequality as further trade liberalization and world 
integration have been developed. Although the formal sector of the economy has grown 
progressively, the steady dynamics and still important share of informal employment (two 
thirds of the labour force) – which is generally associated with poor working conditions – 
along with the increasing share of wage workers in total employment represent intriguing 
facets  of  the  Vietnamese  labour  market.  However,  Cling  et  al.  (2010a)  provide  a 
comparative analysis showing that Vietnam’s informal sector shares many similarities with 
Africa’s,  despite  numerous  differences,  especially  in  terms  of  development  level  and 
economic structure.  
While  most  of  the  papers  on  this  topic  are  drawn  from  (emerging)  Latin  American  or 
African countries, Vietnam represents an interesting case. First, no previous analysis on this 
issue has been undertaken in this region of the world. Do Vietnam’s specific circumstances 
(unique economic regime, role of the State, fast growing economy) make a difference? This 
topic is all the more relevant that it is directly linked to a key policy issue: a universal social 
insurance  scheme  is  to  be  implemented  in  the  coming  years  by  the  Socio-Economic 
Development Strategy (SEDS 2011-2020). Second, our work intends to complete the puzzle 
by broadening the spectrum of developing countries where the two alternative views can be 
assessed, in order to draw more general conclusions. In particular, does the exit option still 
hold in poorer countries? 
Our empirical analysis consists of assessing the magnitude of different types of informal-
formal earnings gaps using OLS and quantile regressions. We use a worker level definition 
of  informality,  the  so-called  informal/formal  employment  divide  (Hussmanns,  2004). 
Standard earnings equations are estimated at the mean and at various conditional quantiles 
of the earnings distribution. In particular, we estimate fixed effects quantile regressions to 
control  for  unobserved  individual  characteristics,  focusing  particularly  on  heterogeneity 
within both the formal and informal employment categories. Our purpose is to address the 
important  issue  of  heterogeneity  at  two  levels:  the  worker  level,  taking  into  account 
individual  unobserved  characteristics;  the  job  level,  comparing  wage  workers  with  self-
employed workers. 4 
 
Our results suggest that the informal earnings gap highly depends on the workers’ job status 
(wage  employment  vs.  self-employment)  and  on  their  relative  position  in  the  earnings 
distribution. Penalties may in some cases turn into premiums. In particular, while informal 
workers suffer penalties vis-à-vis formal workers, this feature is mainly due to informal 
wage earners. In fact, informal self-employed workers receive a premium vis-à-vis formal 
wage workers, which is increasing along the pay ladder. Gender issues are also examined. 
By  comparing  our  results  with  studies  using  similar  methodologies  in  other  developing 
countries, we draw conclusions highlighting the Vietnam’s labour market specificity. This 
specificity puts Vietnam closer to Mexico (and  to a lesser extend Brazil) than to South 
Africa, where the informal-formal gap, although decreasing along the earnings distribution, 
is always negative, even at the highest end of the distribution. Vietnam, although a much 
poorer country, already exhibits a more integrated labour market, which is a characteristic of 
emerging  Latin  American  countries  compared  to  the  dualistic  Sub-Saharan  African 
countries.  Finally,  in  spite  of  the  unique  nature  of  the  Vietnamese  economy  and  its 
contextual background, our results are in line with the literature, emphasizing the dual nature 
of informal jobs. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the context, the data 
and some descriptive elements of income dynamics in the recent period, while Section 3 
focuses on the econometric approach to assess formal-informal earnings gaps. Empirical 
results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  Context, Labour Market Dynamics in Vietnam and Data 
 
 Context  
The growth model embraced by Vietnam during the last two decades, in an urbanization 
context, has prompted deep social economic transformation. The private sector has been 
thriving with the transition of a centrally planned economy towards a “socialist-oriented 
market economy” since the Doi Moi (Renovation) launched in 1986. Economic growth has 
helped reduce poverty considerably but, in the meantime, spark increasing social inequality. 
The gap within a region and between urban and social areas has widened (VASS, 2010; 
Cling et al., 2009). Market freedom, meanwhile, paved the way for the development of an 
informal economy. 
On the labour market, two main striking features are at stake in recent years: first, the rising 
rate of wage and non agricultural employment; second, a sharp increase in real wages and 
labour incomes in recent years (Cling et al., 2010b).  
Vietnam’s impressive economic growth over the last decade has triggered a sharp increase 
in the rate of wage employment: the rate rose from 19% in 1998 to 33% in 2006. Wage 5 
 
employment  grew  particularly  sharply  in  the  industrial  sector  (including  construction) 
during the last ten years. 
This  spread  of  wage  employment  has  affected  all  population  categories  (urban,  rural, 
male,female,  skilled  and  unskilled),  but  substantial  differences  in  level  subsist.  Wage 
employment is obviously more developed among the most skilled manpower (86% among 
the highly skilled as opposed to barely one-quarter among the unskilled), and it is also more 
prevalent among urban dwellers and among men (35% compared to 25% for women). 
The  spreading  of  wage  employment  on  the  Vietnamese  labour  market  has  been 
accompanied by a steep decline in agricultural employment. From 1998 to 2006, the share 
of agricultural jobs has been reduced by 18 percentage points, from 67% to 49%. This trend 
is due to a vibrant urbanization process
1. But, at the same time, in all kinds of geographic 
areas, the proportion of out farm jobs has been on the rise, a shift particularly important in 
peri-urban areas (Cling et al., 2010c). For instance, in the rural surroundings of the two 
biggest cities (Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh), agricultural employment has fallen down from 
58% to 22% during the period. 
Despite  an  important  rate  of  underemployment,  the  second  important  feature  of  the 
Vietnamese labour market is that wages gradually rose from 1998 to 2006. Sharp economic 
growth prompted a 56% increase in wage earners’ average annual remuneration over the 
period observed, which works out at an average annual growth rate of 5.7%. Real wages 
grew at a slower pace in agriculture than in other sectors over the period (28% vs. 34% and 
78% for secondary sector and services; see Table 1). Wage dynamics was higher for the 
semi-skilled  and  high  skilled  workers  than  for  unskilled  workers  (67%,  62%  and  36% 
respectively).  At  the  same  time,  the  increase  was  lower  for  men  than  for  women 
(respectively  +51%  and  +60%  from  1998  to  2006),  mainly  given  the  changes  of  the 
structure  of  the  labour  market  (more  in  favour  of  female  workers).  This  leaded  to  a 
reduction in gender inequalities to some extent (Cling et al., 2009). 
Table 1. Changes in labour structure and earnings in Vietnam, 1998-2006 
  Jobs (%)  Real income (100 = 1998; wage only) 
Sector  1998  2002  2004  2006    1998  2002  2004  2006 
Agriculture  67.1  56.5  52.0  49.2    100  96.2  107.4  128.3 
Secondary sector  13.9  19.7  21.7  23.0    100  109.4  119.6  134.3 
Services  19.0  23.8  26.3  27.8    100  146.1  158.3  177.7 
Total  100  100  100  100    100  121.2  137.1  155.7 
Wage workers  17.5  28.6  31.0  33.1    -  -  -  - 
Source: VLSS 1998, VHLSS 2002, 2004 & 2006, GSO; authors’ calculation. 
Note: Secondary sector includes fishery, mining, manufacture and construction.   
 
                                                           
1 According to the latest population census conducted in 2009, the population has been growing by 3.4% 
annually in urban areas over the last decade, compared to 0.4% per year in rural areas (GSO and UNFPA, 
2009).  6 
 
This context has brought a very optimistic view on the dynamism of the economy and of the 
labour market in Vietnam. Still, this analysis focuses only on the global trends and fails to 
take  into  consideration  the  informal  economy.  The  on-going  restructuring  of  the  labour 
market clearly benefitted the non-farm private sector: the formal sector (both domestic and 
foreign enterprises) but also the household businesses, which the informal sector is the main 
part. The share of large enterprises in total labour force doubled, from a very low 4% in 
1998 to 8% in 2006. In the meantime, non-farm businesses employment increased from 
20% to 35% during the same period. In parallel, the informal jobs (those not covered by 
social insurance scheme) still represent a massive component of the economy. The Labour 
Force Survey conducted in 2007 gives a precise picture of these two dimensions of the 
informal economy (Cling et al., 2010a). Informal sector jobs represent 23% of total jobs and 
nearly a half of non-farm jobs; informal jobs account for 82% of total jobs and two-thirds of 
non-farm jobs.  
Whatever the growth hypotheses in the years to come, employment in the informal sector 
and its share in total employment will rise even without the economic downturn of 2008-
2009. This phenomenon is due to the limited capacity of the private formal sector (even if it 
continues to grow with the same frantic rhythm as prior to the crisis) to absorb the new 
entrants  in  the  labour  market  and  the  workers  who  move  from  agricultural  to  non-
agricultural activities. Therefore, understanding better the informal employment dynamics 
is a key challenge to design policies aiming at protecting its workers, improving the labour 
conditions and increasing productivity, keeping with its intrinsic flexibility.         
 
 Data description  
The  data  used  in  this  paper  are  drawn  from  three  successive  rounds  of  the  Vietnam 
Household Living Standards Surveys (VHLSS 2002, 2004 and 2006). These surveys are 
LSMS surveys’ type, probably one of the most popular household surveys in developing 
countries. In addition, the VHLSS has the reputation of being one of the best LSMS surveys 
in the world. Initially designed by the World Bank to measure and monitor poverty and 
inequality,  LSMS  became  multi-purpose  studies,  covering  almost  all  aspects  of  the 
economic and domestic activities of households. 
In terms of sample design, the VHLSSs are a classical three-stage stratified random survey, 
covering the ordinary households at the national level
2. The sample size is quite large even 
if it has been progressively reduced, from 75,000 in 2002 to 45,000 in 2004 and 2006 (see 
Table  2).  A  detailed  questionnaire  (including  expenditures  and  other  subject  specific 
modules) has been applied to a random subsample of 30,000 and around 9,000 households 
respectively.  To  track  individual  changes  over  time,  a  panel  component  has  been 
                                                           
2 The primary sample units are the communes/wards, the secondary sample units are the census enumeration 
areas or villages and the tertiary sample units correspond to households. For more details, see Phung and  
Nguyen (2006). 7 
 
implemented, selected among the three subsamples. As in other studies, individuals have 
been  matched  between  the  three  surveys  using  the  common  individual  identifier  across 
years, cross-checked with gender, age and other individual information. After undertaking 
thorough data cleaning including checking consistency of time-invariant variables between 
the  three  survey  rounds,  we  have  been  able  to  recover  a  substantial  number  of  new 
individuals, and to correct misclassified ones. In the end, we obtained a more exhaustive 
panel than previous works on the same data .  
Our balanced panel includes 7,408 individuals matched between all the three rounds of 
VHLSS  (see  Table  2);  10,891  individuals  observed  only  in  2002  and  2004;  and  9,529 
individuals observed only  in 2004 and 2006. As the major objective of our study is to 
investigate the question of earnings of workers participating in formal/informal employment 
in private or household enterprises, we retained only those individuals who are 15 years old 
or  more,  engaged  in  non-agricultural  and  non-public  activities.  Finally,  our  empirical 
analysis is based on a panel of non-farm workers including 952 individuals observed in all 
three  years  (balanced  part).  In  the  unbalanced  parts,  there  remain  1,564  individuals 
observed in both 2002 and 2004 but not in 2006, and 1,897 individuals who are observed as 
non-farm workers in both 2004 and 2006, but were not surveyed in 2002. 
 
Table 2. Building the panel of individuals with VHLSS 2002, 2004 and 2006 
  2002   2004   2006  
Full sample (household)   75,000   45,000   45,000  
Detailed sample (household)   30,000   9,000   9,000  
All individuals        
-  Unbalanced Panel   18,299   27,828   16,937  
-  Balanced panel   7,408  7,408  7,408 
Population aged 10 years or over*       
-  Unbalanced Panel   13,732  23,326  15,336 
-  Balanced panel   5,742  5,742  5,742 
Non-farm workers aged 15 years or over       
-  Unbalanced Panel   2,516  4,413  2,849 
-  Balanced Panel   952  952  952 
-  Observed in 2002 and 2004   1,564  1,564  - 
-  Observed in 2004 and 2006  -  1,897  1,897 
Source: VHLSS, 2002, 2004 & 2006, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Note: * Those whose information on employment was asked for in 2004 and 2006. In 2002, this section of 




The VHLSS does not allow us to capture the concept of informal sector following strictly 
the international definition (ILO, 2003; SNA, 2008), as the survey has not been designed for 
such a purpose. In Vietnam, the informal sector is defined as all private unincorporated 
enterprises that produce at least some of their goods and services for sale or barter, are not 
registered  (have no business licence) and are engaged in non-agricultural activities. The 
informal employment corresponds to employment with no social security insurance. On the 
job side in the VHLSS, the formal/informal divide can only be computed for wage workers. 
On the firm side, household businesses can be split between registered and not registered 
ones, but no information is available on the jobs generated by these businesses. Therefore, 
we created an informality proxy, perfectly consistent with the ILO definition of informal 
employment, which combines job and firm approaches. Four main groups are distinguished. 
Among  wage  workers,  informal  ones  are  those  who  do  not  benefit  from  social  security 
insurance. Among employers and self-employed, informal workers are those whose business 
is  not  registered.  As  in  other  studies,  we  exclude  agriculture  from  the  analysis.  This 
classification provides the best available measures of informality in Vietnam, previous to the 
LFS2007 (which unfortunately does not provide any panel component; Cling et al., 2010).  
Information on informality can be tracked in the questionnaire by the “Employment” and 
“Non-Farm  Household  Business”  (NFHB)  modules.  Apart  from  our  formal/informal 
variable, we compute the labour income associated with each remunerated job. For wage 
workers,  earnings  are  obtained  by  summing  the  direct  wage  with  all  the  supplementary 
benefits  perceived  in  cash  or  in  kind  and  converted  into  pecuniary  equivalent  (public 
holidays, bonuses, social allowance, etc.). For the self-employed, we compute their annual 
net income by subtracting all the expenses engaged (intermediary consumption, labour costs, 
taxes, etc.) to the production generated by the household business. Hourly earnings used in 
the econometric analysis are deduced using the total number of hours  worked per  year. 
Additionally, all the classical individual and household based socio-demographic variables 
are appended to our database. 
Finally, regional and time deflators have been elaborated to compute real earnings. As the 
regional deflators (16 locations, i.e. 8 regions in two areas, urban and rural) included in the 
VHLSS databases have been criticized for not being consistent over time (McCaig et al., 
2009), we combined the VHLSS 2006 regional deflators (supposed to be the most reliable) 
with the provincial CPIs (63 provinces) provided by the General Statistics Office aggregated 
at the regional level. This adjustment is quite substantial given the high differences in price 
levels and inflation: a difference of more than 77% in prices is observed between the lowest 
price level (rural North-East region, 2002) and highest one (urban South-East region, 2006), 






3.  Econometric Approach to Measuring Informal-Formal Earnings Gaps 
 
The empirical analysis consists of assessing the magnitude of different types of informal-
formal  earnings  gaps  using  OLS  and  quantile  regressions  with  log  hourly  earnings  as 
dependent  variable.  Standard  earnings  equations  are  thus  estimated  at  the  mean  and  at 
various conditional quantiles of the earnings distribution. The models are regressed on a 
pooled  sample  of  workers  over  years  employed  formally  and  informally.  The  different 
covariates introduced into the regressions are the completed years of education, the years of 
potential experience (with quadratic profiles for these two regressors), a dummy for being 
married,  a  dummy  for  being  a  woman,  eight  dummy  variables  of  branch  activities
3  to 
account for technological differences between activities, seven regional dummies and two 
time dummies to control for macroeconomic trend effects on earnings. 
A number of studies based on data on African manufacturing firms have shown that wages 
are positively correlated to firm size, conditional on standard human capital variables.
4 The 
literature discusses numerous reasons why wages are positively correlated with firm size. 
One of the frequently made arguments is that firm size is correlated with omitted worker 
quality because large firms usually attract more productive workers. In this paper, due to 
lack of information on the demand side characteristics, we cannot control for the size of the 
wage workers’ firms but we control for both observed human capital and time-invariant 
unobserved characteristics, thus mitigating the drawback of not accounting for firm size in 
the regressions.  
To account for informal-formal differences in earnings at the mean earnings level, we rely 
on pooled OLS regressions across years and Fixed Effects OLS regressions (FEOLS), the 
latter accounting for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The FE model can be written 
as 
    =    
    +      +    +                      (1) 
where     	denotes the vector of characteristics of individual i observed  at  time t (which 
includes a constant term),    	represents a dummy taking value one if person i observed at 
time  t  is  an  informal  worker.  ∝   is  the  time-invariant  individual  heterogeneity  (or  the 
individual fixed effect) and     is an i.i.d. normally distributed stochastic term absorbing 
measurement error. Note that      |   ,   ,    = 0. One could use a random effect (RE) 
model assuming in addition that     |   ,     = 0. However, as in many other cases, this 
condition  is  very  unlikely  to  be  satisfied  as  individual  unobserved  characteristics  are 
generally correlated with workers’ observable characteristics. Hausman's specification test 
                                                           
3 These dummies include “Food and beverage”, “Textile, leather, wood, handicraft”, “Construction”, “Whole 
sale”, “Retail sale”, “Hotel and restaurant”, “Transportation and wharehouse” and “Other manufacture” (the 
reference being “Public sector services”). 
4  See Strobl and Thornton (2002), Manda (2002) and Söderbom, Teal and Wambugu (2005). 10 
 
indeed confirmed a systematic difference in the FE and RE estimators, meaning that the FE 
estimator is consistent, but that the RE estimator is not. 
The  estimated  coefficient       is  interpreted  as  a  measure  of  the  conditional  earnings 
premium/penalty experienced by workers in informal employment compared to workers in 
formal employment. However, as mentioned previously, informal employment is extremely 
heterogeneous and a finer job divide should be considered. We then define four categories of 
workers split by job status (wage workers vs. self-employed workers) and institutional sector 
(formal vs. informal) and create four dummies taking value one if the individual i at time t is 
an informal wage worker (    ), a formal wage worker (    ), an informal self-employed 
worker (    ) and a formal self-employed worker (    ). Taking the formal wage workers as 
the reference category, the model we estimate can be written as  
    =    
    +       +       +      +   +                 (2) 
The estimated coefficients	   ,     and     are interpreted, respectively, as the IW – FW, IS – FW 
and FS – FW conditional earnings gaps. Identification of these conditional earnings gaps 
relies on the presence in the sample of movers between employment states over time. Those 
movers can be compared to the stayers in terms of earnings. As an illustration, we consider a 
simple two-period example and eight cases of transitions out of the various possibilities of 
professional trajectories (which are 16 in a two-period example):  
 
2 cases of stayers: 
      −    |     = 1,     = 1  = Δ               (3) 
      −    |     = 1,     = 1  = Δ                (4) 
with Δ = (   
  −    
  )  
6 cases of movers:  
      −    |     = 1,     = 1  = Δ + θ − δ            (5) 
      −    |     = 1,     = 1  = Δ − δ              (6) 
      −    |     = 1,     = 1  = Δ + θ              (7) 
      −    |     = 1,     = 1  = Δ + λ              (8) 
      −    |     = 1,     = 1  = Δ + λ − θ            (9) 
      −    |     = 1,     = 1  = Δ − θ              (10) 
with Δ = (   
  −    
  )  
Equations (3) and (4) give examples of the changes in earnings for stayers, i.e. for workers 
that do not change their employment state between the two periods. Equations (5) and (6) 
illustrate the changes in earnings for those workers coming from an informal wage job and 11 
 
moving, respectively, into an informal self-employed job and a formal wage job; equations 
(7)  and  (8)  represent  these  earnings  differentials  for  those  coming  from  a  formal  wage 
employment and moving, respectively, into an informal self-employed job and a formal self-
employed job. Finally, the cases of informal self-employed workers moving to, respectively, 
formal self-employed and formal wage jobs are considered in equations (9) and (10).  
The identification strategy of FE on movers is quite standard but, in practice, one should 
verify that the number of moves across employment states is sufficient for a valid use of this 
estimator. We verify that this is the case in Tables 4, 5 and 6 in the next section.  
Finally,  to  allow  the  earnings  gaps  between  job  statuses  to  differ  along  the  earnings 
distribution, we rely on Quantile Regressions (QR). Quantile earnings regressions consider 
specific parts of the conditional distribution of the hourly earnings and indicate the influence 
of the different explanatory variables on conditional earnings respectively at the bottom, at 
the median and at the top of the distribution. 
Using our previous notation, the model that we seek to estimate is: 
  (   ) =    
   ( ) +  ( )     +  ( )     +  ( )    +  ,∀  ∈  0,1       (11) 
where    (   )  is  the	 
th  conditional  quantile  of  the  log  hourly  earnings.  The  set  of 
coefficients  ( )	provide the estimated rates of return to the different covariates at the	 
th 
quantile of the log earnings distribution and the coefficients  ( ), ( )	and	 ( )	measure 
the parts of the earnings differentials that are due to informal-formal job differences at the 
various  quantiles.  In  a  quantile  regression,  the  distribution  of  the  error  term  is  left 
unspecified.  The  quantile  regression  method  provides  robust  estimates,  particularly  for 
misspecification errors related to non-normality and heteroskedasticity. 
When  then  turn  to  Fixed  Effects  Quantile  Regressions  (FEQR).  The  extension  of  the 
standard QR model to longitudinal data has been originally developed by Koenker (2004). 
More recently, Canay (2010) proposed an alternative and simpler approach which assumes 
that the unobserved heterogeneity terms have a pure location shift effect on the conditional 
quantiles of the dependent variable. In other words, they are assumed to affect all quantiles 
in the same way. It follows that these unobserved terms can be estimated in a first step by 
traditional mean estimations (for instance by FE OLS). Then, the predicted      are used to 
correct  earnings,  such  as       =    −       ,  which  are  regressed  on  the  other  regressors  by 
traditional QR.  
When running the regressions (2) and (11), we always provide robust standard errors using 
bootstrap replications. To reduce a possible bias due to measurement and reporting errors in 
the earnings and independent variables, we trim the data and drop influential outliers and 
observations with high leverage points from our sample that we identify by the DFITS-
statistic.  As  suggested  by  Belsley,  Kuh  and  Welsch  (1980),  we  use  a  cutoff-value 
N k DFITS
ihj / 2 >   with  k ,  the  degrees  of  freedom  (plus  1)  and  N  the  number  of 12 
 
observations. This procedure removes 497 observations from our initial unbalanced panel 
sample. 
 
4.  Descriptive statistics and validity checks 
 
Table 3 presents some basic summary statistics of the main characteristics of the panel data 
used  in  our  analysis.  These  descriptive  statistics  are  reported  for  the  sub-samples  of 
wage/self-employed workers, broken down by formal and informal jobs.  
The results obtained for average earnings are in line with common findings in the literature. 
Workers holding formal jobs earn more on average than those engaged in informal jobs. 
Among each group of formal and informal workers, self-employed workers are those with 
higher earnings in comparison with wage earners. Informal workers tend to be younger than 
their  formal  worker  counterparts,  especially  for  wage  workers.  Self-employed  workers 
exhibit on average longer potential experience in the labour market (which is calculated as 
age minus years of reported schooling minus five). As expected, workers having higher level 
of education are less likely to be engaged in informal employment and vice versa.  
At the aggregate level, the gender ratio does not vary between formal and informal jobs. 
However, female workers have more opportunity to get formal wage jobs than informal 
ones.  Finally,  formal  and  informal  workers  are  differently  allocated  across  branches  of 
activity.  Specifically,  informal  employment  is  found  more  in  trade,  restaurants  and 
transportation, while formal jobs are more concentrated in services. Interestingly, the share 
of manufacture is much higher for informal jobs than for formal ones (31% vs. 18%). Within  
employment sectors, the distribution is also fairly unbalanced:  formal  wage workers  are 
stubbornly  engaged  in  services  (60%),  whereas  formal  self-employed  workers  hold 
transportation  and  hotel  &  restaurant  jobs  (12%  and  52%  respectively).  Informal  wage 
workers engaged prominently in construction (13%) and trade (35%) while informal self-
employed  job’s  structure  looks  like  the  formal  self-employed  one.  These  significant 
differences in the distribution of job structure underline the importance of controlling for 










Table 3. Summary Statistics (pooled waves 2002-2004-2006) 
  Formal workers  Informal workers 
  All workers 
Self- 





  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Hourly earnings  1.949  0.63  2.134  0.70  1.885  0.60  1.552  0.60  1.645  0.67  1.450  0.50 
Potential experience  21.98  10.65  26.12  10.66  20.52  10.26  24.22  13.08  28.36  13.08  19.66  11.48 
Age  38.79  10.13  40.47  9.93  38.20  10.14  37.05  12.22  40.88  11.98  32.83  11.03 
Female  0.462  0.50  0.536  0.50  0.436  0.50  0.438  0.50  0.603  0.49  0.256  0.44 
Married  0.787  0.41  0.824  0.38  0.775  0.42  0.703  0.46  0.793  0.41  0.604  0.49 
Position in the family         
Head of household  0.399  0.49  0.390  0.49  0.402  0.49  0.376  0.48  0.382  0.49  0.369  0.48 
Spouse  0.299  0.46  0.375  0.48  0.273  0.45  0.257  0.44  0.386  0.49  0.115  0.32 
Children  0.273  0.45  0.199  0.40  0.299  0.46  0.337  0.47  0.209  0.41  0.479  0.50 
Others  0.029  0.17  0.036  0.19  0.026  0.16  0.030  0.17  0.023  0.15  0.036  0.19 
Education         
No degree  0.020  0.14  0.033  0.18  0.015  0.12  0.091  0.29  0.105  0.31  0.075  0.26 
Primary  0.112  0.32  0.236  0.43  0.069  0.25  0.324  0.47  0.330  0.47  0.318  0.47 
Secondary  0.489  0.50  0.613  0.49  0.445  0.50  0.455  0.50  0.432  0.50  0.481  0.50 
University & others  0.379  0.49  0.117  0.32  0.471  0.50  0.129  0.34  0.133  0.34  0.126  0.33 
Industry         
Food and beverage  0.037  0.19  0.038  0.19  0.037  0.19  0.060  0.24  0.068  0.25  0.051  0.22 
Textile, leather, wood, 
handicraft  0.075  0.26  0.068  0.25  0.077  0.27  0.154  0.36  0.147  0.35  0.162  0.37 
Construction  0.119  0.32  0.062  0.24  0.139  0.35  0.083  0.28  0.040  0.20  0.131  0.34 
Whole sale  0.031  0.17  0.004  0.06  0.041  0.20  0.180  0.38  0.013  0.11  0.364  0.48 
Retail sale  0.025  0.16  0.049  0.22  0.016  0.13  0.017  0.13  0.025  0.16  0.009  0.09 
Hotel and restaurant  0.149  0.36  0.513  0.50  0.022  0.15  0.264  0.44  0.433  0.50  0.078  0.27 
Transportation & 
wharehouse  0.040  0.20  0.134  0.34  0.006  0.08  0.086  0.28  0.135  0.34  0.033  0.18 
Other manufacture  0.059  0.24  0.067  0.25  0.057  0.23  0.093  0.29  0.093  0.29  0.092  0.29 
Other services  0.465  0.50  0.066  0.25  0.605  0.49  0.063  0.24  0.047  0.21  0.081  0.27 
Number of observations  4,036  1,049  2,987  5038  2,639  2,399 
Source: VHLSS, 2002, 2004 & 2006, GSO; authors’ calculations. 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 report the transition matrices of employment status between 2002-2004, 
2004-2006 and 2002-2006 obtained from our unbalanced panel dataset. In order to provide a 
more general picture of the dynamics of switching between employment status, we present 
the results obtained from the panel of all individuals aged 15 or more. The categories shown 
in  the  matrices  include  then  not  only  the  four  non-farm  employment  statuses  but  also 
“agriculture”  and  “not-working”  (the  latter  category  including,  to  simplify  the  notation, 
those  who  are  inactive  or  unemployed).  This  presentation  allows  identification  of  both 
transition flows within the non-farm sector employment and those into or out of the non-
farm sector. The figures in the first two rows and columns of each matrix reveal that the 
latter are not negligible. Among these, we observe that the most important flows are those 
between informal non-farm and agricultural jobs. These patterns of mobility would partly 14 
 
reflect the low entry barriers to both sectors as well as the fact that the majority of the 
workforce  in  Vietnam  is  still  predominantly  employed  in  agriculture.  Another  striking 
evidence on the flows of transition from non-farm employment is the rather high probability 
of becoming inactive or unemployed for those who were previously self-employed.  


















employed  Total 
Not-working  62.77  19.64  3.45  5.74  2.33  6.06  100 (21.7) 
Agricultural emp.  7.4  80.39  1.59  5.58  0.68  4.36  100 (50.2) 
Formal Wage worker  3.51  6.15  74.34  13.76  0.88  1.37  100   (8.9) 
Informal Wage worker  5.01  17.05  3.65  62.25  3.11  8.93  100   (6.5) 
Formal Self-employed 
worker  7.1  5.03  1.78  5.33  55.92  24.85  100   (2.9) 
Informal Self-employed 
worker  6.7  16.3  1.45  8.06  12.23  55.25  100   (9.8) 
Total  18.88  47.98  8.64  10.25  3.96  10.28  100     (100) 
Source: VHLSS, 2002 & 2004, GSO; authors’ calculations. 


















employed  Total 
Not-working  81.34  10.36  1.96  3.5  0.92  1.92  100 (33.4) 
Agricultural emp.  10.33  78.24  1.54  4.73  0.89  4.26  100 (39.7) 
Formal Wage worker  3.72  5.37  81.51  6.61  0.62  2.17  100   (6.7) 
Informal Wage worker  5.5  15.26  8.7  60.16  2.57  7.81  100   (7.9) 
Formal Self-employed 
worker  12.13  6.07  1.57  3.72  49.12  27.4  100   (3.6) 
Informal Self-employed 
worker  7.7  14.68  1.84  6.58  9.3  59.9  100   (8.7) 
Total  33.07  37.61  7.66  8.92  3.46  9.27  100     (100) 
Source: VHLSS, 2004 & 2006, GSO; authors’ calculations. 


















employed  Total 
Not-working  55.29  17.65  6.87  9.62  2.64  7.93  100 (19.9) 
Agricultural emp.  7.32  76.44  2.76  6.44  1.12  5.92  100 (52.5) 
Formal Wage worker  4.29  5.81  74.49  11.87  0.76  2.78  100   (8.3) 
Informal Wage worker  5.35  17.06  4.35  55.18  3.68  14.38  100   (6.2) 
Formal Self-employed 
worker  13.1  7.59  2.07  2.07  51.03  24.14  100   (3.2) 
Informal Self-employed 
worker  10.34  20.46  2.95  7.38  9.7  49.16  100   (9.9) 
Total  16.95  47.48  9.64  10.55  3.93  11.45  100     (100) 
Source: VHLSS, 2002 & 2006, GSO; authors’ calculations. 15 
 
For the purpose of measuring informal earnings gaps, we focus hereafter on the transition 
flows within the non-farm jobs (figured in the shaded cells in the transition matrices). They 
show that, on average, not negligible flows are observed between non-farm job’s categories.  
For the two time periods, around one quarter of workers changed position from one of our 
four job’s status to another. Around 20% of the total sample moved from informal to formal 
jobs and the rates of formal-informal transitions are about 40%. However, the flows are 
balanced in absolute terms. The fluidity between wage and non-wage jobs is smaller, but is 
far from being negligible (from 13% to 15% of the total sample, depending on the years). 
Here again, the movements to and from wage jobs are relatively symmetrical. At a more 
disaggregated level, job mobility is at its highest for formal self-employed workers, where 
less than two thirds keep the same status in our different panels. Formal wage workers are 
the most stable (82% to 74% of stayers), while informal workers (wage and non-wage) are 
in between with a proportion of stayers ranging from 55% to 62%. Formal wage workers 
mainly move to informal wage jobs. When moving, informal wage workers tend to privilege 
informal self-employed positions, and secondarily formal wage jobs. Formal self-employed 
movers mainly get their business informalized (probably due to adverse conditions). A lower 
share  of  informal  self-employed  workers  makes  the  inverse  move,  by  formalizing  their 
business. However, a substantial proportion also closes their business to become informal 
wage workers.  
All in all, the high consistency between our transition matrices over different samples and 
time  periods  appears  to  be  a  sound  indicator  of  data  quality.  We  would  claim  that  the 
observed changes reflect real phenomena and do not mainly capture measurement errors. 
Furthermore, on the methodological side, the substantial numbers of movers is key for our 
estimation strategy. However, it is also important that the movements between these types of 
jobs do not specifically concentrate on certain workers in the sample. In order to verify that, 
we examine the rate of transitions across employment statuses at different earnings quantile 
levels. Figure A0 in Appendix shows the proportion of movers out of (or into) informal 
employment in each earnings quantiles in the base (or current) period. As can be seen in this 
figure,  there  is  a  substantial  proportion  of  movements  in  both  directions  at  all  earnings 
levels. Overall, the transitions are more frequent in the upper quintiles and this is found for 
both types of transition.  
Another  necessary  validity  check  for  our  estimation  of  earnings  gaps  is  to  verify  the 
existence of actual job changes resulting from declared changes in occupation and industry 
type. Theoretically, tenure in the current job could be another ideal criterion to assess job 
changes. However, available information in VHLSS 2002 does not allow this assessment. 
Table A0 in the Appendix reports the rates of changes in occupation and/or industry of 
activity  accompanied  by  transitions  across  informal  and  formal  employment.  Overall, 
around 60% of inter-sector movements are concomitant with changes in at least one of the 
two employment characteristics. This reinforces  our confidence in the existence of limited 
measurement errors related to the reported employment status at certain time. 16 
 
To end this section on descriptive analysis, let us have look at the earnings dynamics by 
employment status. We focus on the period 2004-2006. The first panel of Table 7 shows the 
level  of  real  earning  in  2006  by  transition  status,  formal  wage  stayers  being  our  basis. 
Consistently with Table 3, formal self-employed workers get the highest pay, while informal 
wage workers are at the lowest end of the earnings ladder. Compared to the pooled sample, 
in 2006, informal self-employed workers reversed their position with formal wage workers, 
meaning that the earnings hierarchy between these two categories of workers is not fixed, 
but may vary over time. Furthermore, earnings levels are highly dependent on transitions. 
For  instance,  and  as  expected,  whatever  their  job  status  in  2004,  those  who  moved  to 
informal wage jobs earn the less. Conversely, the workers who got the opportunity to open a 
formal business earn the most. The results are quite similar in terms of earnings growth 
(second panel of Table 7). Systematically, moving to informal wage jobs is associated with 
the lowest increase in earnings over the period, whereas being able to change to a formal 
self-employed  job  is  associated  with  the  highest  earnings  growth.  Of  course,  these 
unconditional averages should be controlled for observed and unobserved characteristics, 
which is the purpose of the following sections.        
 
Table 7. Earnings dynamics by employment status between 2004 and 2006 
2004 











Formal wage worker  100.0  58.5  106.8  83.1  75.0 
Informal wage worker  62.5  49.7  72.7  55.2  54.5 
Formal self-employed  99.8  67.6  157.7  132.7  114.8 
Informal self-employed  86.2  61.4  123.5  94.8  85.3 
Total  82.9  59.2  121.7  88.0  80.1 
 
2004 
Real hourly earnings growth 2004-2006 
2006 
Formal wage worker  100.0  90.0  100.2  95.7  94.5 
Informal wage worker  92.4  86.1  94.9  87.5  87.9 
Formal self-employed  99.7  92.9  104.5  102.4  100.9 
Informal self-employed  97.5  90.8  101.6  97.7  96.4 
Total  96.9  90.0  102.1  95.5  95.0 
Source: VHLSS 2002, 2004 & 2006, GSO; authors’ calculations. 




5.  Earnings gaps analysis 
 
In  this  section  we  discuss  the  earning  gaps  between  formal  and  informal  jobs  at  the 
aggregate level, estimated using the four estimations procedures presented in Section 3. As 
discussed  earlier,  the  informal  sector,  and  more  broadly  the  informal  employment,  is 17 
 
immensely  heterogeneous.  The  theoretical  literature,  as  our  own  empirical  evidence, 
suggests that a key divide should be considered within the informal jobs, between wage 
workers and self-employed. If the point is now well established in the literature, formal job 
heterogeneity is rarely acknowledged. So we distinguish between four groups of workers, 
split by job status  (wage workers vs. self-employed) and institutional sector  (formal vs. 
informal). In the following discussion, we compare the three other work status with formal 
wage workers, as our benchmark. We also investigate the gender issue. 
 
Formal vs. informal workers 
At the aggregate level, the OLS estimate of the informal employment earnings gap is a 
rather  huge  -25%  (Figure  1A  and  Table  A1).  Taking  into  account  the  (time  invariant) 
unobservable  individual  characteristics  (UICs)  through  fixed  effect  OLS  estimation 
(FEOLS) reduces the earnings penalty significantly, down to -15%. Thus, nearly half of the 
gap  can  be  explained  by  unobservable  characteristics,  the  most  productive  workers 
privileging the formal sector. As always, this standard feature does not tell us much about 
what specific factors are really at play. On the one hand, the innate ability or the “talent 
parabola” is commonly stressed in the literature. On the other hand, many other explanations 
can be put forward. For instance, UICs may have to do with more efficient social networks 
to get a formal job. However, the remaining -15% gap, once we control for UICs, highlights 
that formal jobs provide higher earnings per se. Here again, this result can be due to various 
factors which end up, at the firm level, in a higher productivity or market power, and/or, at 
the  worker  level,  in  a  stronger  bargaining  power  of  formal  workers  to  negotiate  higher 
earnings.   
To go beyond average, we ran quantile regressions (QR, Figure 1A and Tables A4 and A5). 
While  suffering  earnings  penalties  at  all  levels  of  the  conditional  distribution,  informal 
workers suffer a smaller gap at the bottom part. From around -23% for the first two quartiles 
of income, the gap increases to reach -30% at the upper-tier of the distribution (quantile .90). 
However, the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are too large for the estimated QR gaps 
to be significantly different from the OLS estimator. The Fixed Effects Quantile Regression 
(FEQR) gap not only confirms the key role of UICs in reducing the “true” gap but also 
reveals a remarkable change in the pattern along the earnings distribution. Opposite to the 
estimated  QR  gaps,  the  FEQR  gaps  are  decreasing  continuously  along  the  earnings 
distribution, from 19% for the bottom quantile to 10% for the upper one. If a higher number 
of observations could have increased the precision of our estimates, this result is mainly due 
to  the  fact  that  the  “dualistic  assumption”  is  too  rough,  gathering  together  very  diverse 





Formal vs. informal wage workers 
As expected, within wage workers, those employed informally are on average worse-off 
than  those  formally  hired,  the  global  picture  being  similar  to  the  one  observed  for  all 
workers  (Figure  1B  and  Table  A1,  column  (3)).  The  OLS  gap  (-23%)  is  significantly 
reduced to -11% when individual fixed effects are introduced, suggesting that informal wage 
workers may have a disadvantage in terms of their unobserved productive attributes. Not 
taking into account the fixed effects, no clear distributional effects can be identified; which 
is not the case when controlling for UIC (Figure 1B and Tables A4 and A5): the gap is 
continuously decreasing from -16% (quantile .10) to -5% (quantile .90). Nevertheless, in 
both cases, formal salaried workers conserve an earnings advantage at any position in the 
pay ladder. Even if we cannot exclude that non pecuniary disadvantages of formal wage jobs 
may be compensated by earnings (such as poor working conditions)
5, these results could be 
taken as an acceptable validation of the exclusion hypothesis (for this category of workers), 
according  to  which  informal  wage  workers  are  constraint  in  their  job  choice,  and  are 
probably queuing for formal jobs.  
 
Formal wage vs. informal self-employed workers 
For the bulk of the labour force, this alternative choice is probably the main trade-off, and 
also the most discussed in the literature. At odd with the previous case considered and more 
generally  the  dualistic  approach,  the  conditional  OLS  gap  is  positive,  with  a  significant 
premium of +6% for the informal self-employed (Figure 1C and Table A1, column (3)). 
Furthermore, the FEOLS models increase the premium further to +14% (column (5)). This 
would  mean  that  informal  self-employed  workers  have  a  disadvantage  in  terms  of  their 
unobserved  productive  characteristics  (probably  in  terms  of  their  entrepreneurial  skills), 
which produces an underestimation of the premium associated with being an informal self-
employed  worker  compared  to  exerting  as  a  formal  wage  worker  if  this  individual 
heterogeneity is not accounted for. We nevertheless should be cautious before claiming that 
the exit option may be at stake, as the self-employed earnings may be overestimated for at 
least two reasons: first, the measure of earnings we computed remunerates both labour and 
capital  factors,  the  latter  being  far  from  negligible  in  the  informal  sector  (Cling  et  al., 
2010a); second, the self-employed earnings include the share which should be attributed to 
the  productive  contribution  of  unpaid  family  workers.  As  we  do  not  have  any  order  of 
magnitude of these two phenomena, it is difficult to exclude the possibility that the premium 
we obtain may not turn into a penalty, once these two factors are taken into account.
6  
                                                           
5 For a detailed analysis of the possible existing pecuniary compensations for working conditions along the 
earnings distribution, see Fernández and Nordman (2009) in the case of UK. 
6 The definitive assessment is even more complex as measurement errors in incomes are usually considered as 
more important for self-employed than for wage workers, as the former usually do not know their precise level 
of  income  (especially  informal  workers  who  do  not  have  book  accounts),  and  the  richest  ones  tend  to 
understate their level of activity.  19 
 
When turning to quantile regressions (Figure 1C and Tables A4 and A5), the distributional 
profile of the gap presents a clear pattern, contrary to that of the formal vs. informal wage 
workers. The gap steeply increases with earnings level, and is in favour of the informal self-
employed workers. In absolute terms, informal self-employed labourers suffer a penalty only 
at the lowest end of the conditional distribution (up to about quantile .30). Afterwards, the 
gap is reversed into a significant premium, growing continuously up to around 35% for the 
richest decile, crossing the OLS estimate at the median point of the earnings distribution. 
FEQR confirm this trend, the only difference being that the range of variation of the gap 
along the distribution is attenuated. However, once the UICs are controlled for, informal 
self-employed workers are better-off at all points of the pay scale, from +2% at quantile .10 
to +28% at quantile .90. All in all, and given the size of the premium, we can confidently 
conclude  that  informal  self-employment  may  be  more  lucrative  that  formal  wage 
alternatives, especially for the richest workers. As a matter of consequence, we have good 
presumptions to assert that, in Vietnam, a substantial part of the labour force has deliberately 
chosen to work in the informal sector as non-wage workers, for pecuniary reasons. 
 
Formal wage vs. formal self-employed workers 
The  earnings  comparison  of  formal  wage  workers  and  formal  self-employed  workers  is 
clearly  in  favour  of  the  latter,  whatever  the  model  chosen  (Figure  1D  and  Tables  A1, 
columns (3) and (5)). The OLS estimate presents a +40% premium, just slightly reduced 
with  fixed  effects  (+32%).  Compared  to  the  informal  self-employed  workers,  their 
unobserved productive attributes may be better than those of the formal wage workers. As in 
the case of informal self-employed workers, the premium is continuously increasing with 
earnings  levels,  but  is  translated  upwards,  a  pattern  in  line  with  the  empirical  results 
obtained in the literature for developed countries. Controlling for UICs or not, formal self-
employed workers are always better-off in terms of earnings than formal wage workers, the 
premium culminating at +70% (QR) or +47% (FEQR). Overall, it seems that the Vietnamese 
labour market functions under a regime of wage repression. Whatever the reasons - macro 
pressures  of  international  integration  or  deliberate  policies  to  control  inflation,  or  weak 
bargaining  power  of  the  wage  workers  -,  it  seems  globally  preferable  to  work  as  an 
independent  (even  in  the  informal  sector)  than  as  a  wage  worker  (at  least  in  non-farm 
activities).  
 
Formal vs. informal self-employed workers 
Lastly, we turn to the comparison between the two kinds of self-employed workers: formal 
and informal. Formal self-employed workers are rarely considered in the literature, may be 
because they are too few in the countries considered. That is clearly not the case in Vietnam, 
as they represent 13% of our sample and more than 40% of the self-employed workers. 
Furthermore, there are many additional reasons to focus on this category of workers: first, to 
compare our results with those obtained in developed countries on salaried vs. non-salaried 20 
 
workers’ earnings gap, as in these countries self-employed workers are quasi-exclusively 
formal; second, because it allows us to establish the link with the existing formal/informal 
sector literature from a business perspective (not job). Finally, the comparison appears more 
legitimate as the nature of incomes and unobservables potentially at play are in both cases 
equivalent (which is not true concerning wage workers).  
Formal self-employed workers are systematically in a better position than their informal 
counterparts, all along the pay scale (Figure 1E; the reference group is now informal self-
employed  workers;  regressions  tables  are  not  reported  to  save  space).  Returns  to  firm’s 
formalization is always positive and increasing with the net earnings, even when controlling 
for entrepreneurial skills and other unobserved  characteristics, the most favoured in this 
respect choosing disproportionately the formal sector. This advantage of formal household 
businesses  may  be  due  to  higher  initial  level  of  physical  capital  or  more  productive 
combination  of  factors  (our  models  do  not  provide  elements  on  this  point),  but  it  is 
compatible  with  the  potential  intrinsic  benefits  of  getting  formal  (access  to  credit  and 
markets) as found by Rand and Torm (2010) in the case of Vietnam. 
 
A gender perspective 
Exploring the gender dimension associated with informality is crucial for various reasons. 
First,  there  is  strong  imbalances  in  the  job  structure,  female  being  more  prone  to  hold 
informal jobs than their male counterparts. Second, the raw gender earnings gap is in general 
significantly higher in the informal sector.
7 Finally, and more importantly, the motivation to 
hold informal jobs is highly dependent on gender. Women may have a welfare function 
which is less dependent on income incentives, as they take more care of extra professional 
activities (as family life, children care, social relations, etc.), where informal jobs could be a 
more satisfying option. Without going into details, we highlight the main findings displayed 
in Figures 2 and Figures 3 and their corresponding regression tables reported in Tables A2, 
A3 and A6 to A9.   
Firstly, whatever the models’ specifications and the category of workers considered, females 
always financially suffer more (or benefit less) when they are informally employed. For 
instance, at the aggregate formal/informal level (Figures 2A and 3A), the OLS gap is -19% 
for  men  and  -30%  for  women;  the  FEOLS  being  respectively  -11%  and  -20%.  Such  a 
feature is compatible with the idea mentioned above, that women may accept lower wages in 
the  informal  sector  because  it  provides  other  non-pecuniary  advantages,  relatively  more 
valuable to them. However, it can also reveal barriers or labour market segmentation, which 
would be more pronounced for women competing for salaried jobs. Interestingly, while the 
                                                           
7 For Africa, see Nordman, Robilliard and Roubaud (2011) for estimates of the gender earnings gap in the 
formal and informal sectors of different West African capital cities using household surveys, and Nordman and 
Wolff (2010) for formal sector gender earnings gaps using matched worker-firm datasets for seven African 
countries. 21 
 
penalty  for being informal wage workers  remains substantial for  women once UICs are 
controlled for (-18%, Figure 3B and column (5) of Table A3), it is no more significant for 
men.  For  the  latter,  working  informally  is  at  least  financially  as  rewarding  as  having  a 
formal job, whether dependent (Figure 3B) or independent (Figure 3C).  
Secondly, in spite of differences in absolute levels, the distributional profile of the earnings 
gaps is quite similar across gender: no noticeable effect for wage workers, an increasing 
premium for self-employed workers, both formal and informal. The only exception is for 
informal wage workers, where this type of jobs seems to be relatively more attractive for 
women in the upper tier, while the gap increases smoothly for men.  
Thirdly, the sorting process in the allocation of men and women across employment status 
(which is partly revealed by the effect of controlling for UICs) does not differ substantially 
across  gender:  informal  wage  workers  have  detrimental  UICs  (in  order  to  get  a  better 
income) vis-à-vis formal wage workers, while the unobserved skills are favourable for self-
employed  workers  (whether  formal  or  informal).  The  only  exception  is  for  male  wage 
workers, who have comparable UICs along the formal/informal divide.   
 
The Vietnamese case in perspective 
Comparing  our  results  with  those  obtained  in  other  developing  countries  allows  us  to 
highlight the Vietnam’s labour market specificities. One point should be stressed however: 
the number of countries of comparison is rather limited, mainly restricted to Latin America; 
more, to our knowledge, the only paper to undertake FEQR is Bargain and Kwenda (2010), 
with the limitation that these authors present estimates for a subsample of full time male 
workers (but with the advantage of much larger sample sizes). In spite of the unique nature 
of the Vietnamese economy and its contextual background, our results are in line with the 
literature, emphasizing the dual nature of informal jobs. Furthermore, as our estimations are 
also conducted for women, with globally similar gap structures, these converging results 
may be generalized as a stylized feature. 
While, on the whole, informal workers suffer penalties vis-à-vis formal workers, this feature 
is mainly due to informal wage earners. In fact, informal self-employed workers receive a 
premium vis-à-vis formal wage workers, which is increasing along the pay ladder. This 
feature put Vietnam closer to Mexico (and to a lesser extend Brazil) than to South Africa, 
where  the  gap,  although  decreasing,  is  always  negative,  even  at  the  highest  end  of  the 
earnings distribution. Vietnam, although a much poorer country, already exhibits a more 
integrated labour market, which is a characteristic of emerging Latin American countries 
compared  to  the  dualistic  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  (see  Bocquier,  Nordman  and 
Vescovo, 2010). It seems that the labour market segmentation is even less pronounced there 
than in the former countries, as it is the only of the four abovementioned countries where 
informal wage workers do not suffer penalties compared to their formal counterparts (only 
for males).  22 
 
Finally, formal self-employed workers represent a very specific job segment, at the top of 
the earnings hierarchy, which should neither be aggregated with formal wage earners, nor 
discarded from the analysis as in many other studies. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Our paper focuses on formal/informal earnings gap in Vietnam, in order to shed light on two 
alternative views as regard informality: the exclusion hypothesis vs. the exit hypothesis. 
Taking advantage of the rich VHLSS datasets, the three rounds of panel surveys (2002, 2004 
and 2006) give the unique opportunity to control for time invariant unobserved individual 
characteristics. Using both standard and fixed effects earnings equations estimated at the 
mean and at various conditional quantiles of the earnings distribution, we address the key 
issue  of  heterogeneity,  at  three  different  levels:  the  worker  level,  taking  into  account 
individual  unobserved  characteristics;  the  job  level,  comparing  wage  workers  with  self-
employed  workers;  the  distributional  level.  Gender  issues  are  also  examined.  To  our 
knowledge, this approach is applied for the first time ever in Vietnam, and more broadly in 
the South-East Asian region.   
Our results suggest that the informal earnings gap highly depends on the workers’ job status 
(wage  employment  vs.  self-employment)  and  on  their  relative  position  in  the  earnings 
distribution. Our main conclusion is at odds with the exclusion hypothesis and what would 
show the observed raw earnings gaps: in many cases, informal jobs are more rewarding 
(self-employment) or as rewarding (male wage workers) as formal wage jobs. This feature is 
due to the relatively low wages of formal wage jobs. The reason for such a specificity should 
be  investigated  further  (international  competition  pressure?  wage  repression  policy?). 
Second, Vietnam’s labour market seems more integrated than what its development level 
would  have  predicted.  The  earnings  gaps  look  more  like  those  observed  in  emerging 
countries, characterized by a weak segmentation between formal and informal jobs, than the 
standard dualistic Sub-Saharan labour markets. Third, the systematic premium at all points 
of  the  distribution  of  formal  self-employed  workers  over  their  informal  counterparts 
suggests  that  formalization  of  non-farm  household  businesses  seems  to  be  beneficial. 
Policies  aiming  at  easing  administrative  procedures  to  register  informal  firms  should  be 
encouraged. Finally, females always financially suffer more (or benefit less) when they are 
informally employed. This feature opens space for specific policies to align the functioning 
of labour market for women with that of men (reduction in entry barriers to formal jobs, 
improvement of access to physical capital, etc.). 
Our paper raises further promising prospects, and could be extended in various directions. A 
first  extension  would  be  to  better  control  for  individual  unobserved  characteristics,  by 
purging our earning estimations of differences in the amount of physical capital (for self-23 
 
employed workers) and social networks. A firm based panel approach may be an interesting 
alternative entry in this respect. Another potential extension would be to exploit further the 
nature of our data (three point panel) by estimating dynamic earnings equations. Lastly, our 
work could be usefully complemented by investigating the determinants of job satisfaction, 
to enlarge the perspective which relies exclusively on earnings outputs and to check the 
robustness of our conclusions in this regard.  
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Figures 1. Estimated Earnings Gaps for Full Sample of Men and Women 
(with reference to formal wage workers) 
 
Note: Fixed Effects (FE) OLS are denoted by FEOLS and Fixed Effects Quantile Regressions (QR) by FEQR. 
Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are represented by the grey surface for QR and by dashed lines for the 
OLS. 
 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figures 2. Estimated Earnings Gaps for Women and Men Separately by OLS and QR 
(with reference to formal wage workers) 
 
Note: Fixed Effects (FE) OLS are denoted by FEOLS and Fixed Effects Quantile Regressions (QR) by FEQR. 
Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are represented by the grey surface for QR and by dashed lines for the 
OLS. 
 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figures 3. Estimated Earnings Gaps for Women and Men Separately  
by FEOLS and FEQR 
(with reference to formal wage workers) 
 
 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A0: Distribution of Movers in/out of the Informal Employment (%) 
 
All  Men  Women 
 
Source: VHLSS, 2002 & 2006, GSO; authors’ calculations.  




Table A0. Inter-sector Switches and Job Changes (%) 
 
Job changes/Type of transition  2002 – 2004  2004 – 2006 
Informal – formal 
Change in occupation  41.9  46.7 
Change in industry  36.5  42.7 
Change in occupation and/or industry  50.0  62.7 
Formal – informal 
Change in occupation  42.4  44.4 
Change in industry  40.0  41.7 
Change in occupation and/or industry  69.0  59.7 
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Table A1. Mean Earnings Regressions For All Workers  
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
Vietnam VHLSS 2002-2004-2006 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  Pooled OLS  Pooled OLS  Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
           
Informal Worker    -0.250***    -0.152***   
    (0.016)    (0.024)   
Informal Self-Emp.Worker       0.058***    0.143*** 
      (0.021)    (0.045) 
Informal Wage Worker      -0.228***    -0.110*** 
      (0.018)    (0.030) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker      0.402***    0.326*** 
      (0.027)    (0.053) 
Years of schooling  -0.015**  -0.017***  -0.033***     
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)     
Years of schooling squared  0.004***  0.004***  0.005***     
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)     
Potential experience  0.027***  0.025***  0.023***  0.027***  0.026*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Potential experience squared  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female   -0.113***  -0.120***  -0.133***     
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)     
Married  0.132***  0.127***  0.105***  0.035  0.027 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.039)  (0.038) 
Year dummy 2004  0.098***  0.110***  0.111***  0.147***  0.149*** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Year dummy 2006  0.201***  0.214***  0.218***  0.290***  0.293*** 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
Constant  0.881***  1.144***  1.099***  1.584***  1.493*** 
  (0.047)  (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.136)  (0.133) 
Observations  9074  9074  9074  9074  9074 
R-squared  0.252  0.274  0.307  0.093  0.109 
Number of id        4306  4306 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
The regressions also include seven regional dummies and eight branch activity dummies.  
 




Table A2. Mean Earnings Regressions for Men  
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  Pooled OLS  Pooled OLS  Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
           
Informal Worker    -0.194***    -0.109***   
    (0.021)    (0.033)   
Informal Self-Emp.Worker       0.115***    0.201*** 
      (0.029)    (0.055) 
Informal Wage Worker      -0.163***    -0.066* 
      (0.023)    (0.039) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker      0.421***    0.345*** 
      (0.037)    (0.068) 
Years of schooling  -0.020**  -0.019**  -0.036***     
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)     
Years of schooling squared  0.004***  0.004***  0.005***     
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)     
Potential experience  0.031***  0.029***  0.028***  0.027**  0.027** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Potential experience squared  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Married  0.120***  0.117***  0.099***  0.017  0.009 
  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.043)  (0.042) 
Year dummy 2004  0.097***  0.107***  0.108***  0.151***  0.154*** 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Year dummy 2006  0.202***  0.213***  0.217***  0.297***  0.297*** 
  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
Constant  0.880***  1.078***  1.045***  1.606***  1.501*** 
  (0.064)  (0.065)  (0.063)  (0.179)  (0.173) 
           
Observations  5004  5004  5004  5004  5004 
R-squared  0.264  0.278  0.317  0.109  0.130 
Number of id        2366  2366 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
The regressions also include seven regional dummies and eight branch activity dummies.  
 






Table A3. Mean Earnings Regressions for Women  
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  Pooled OLS  Pooled OLS  Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
           
Informal Worker    -0.306***    -0.197***   
    (0.023)    (0.035)   
Informal Self-Emp.Worker       0.017    0.042 
      (0.033)    (0.079) 
Informal Wage Worker      -0.330***    -0.178*** 
      (0.029)    (0.048) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker      0.378***    0.251*** 
      (0.040)    (0.088) 
Years of schooling  -0.005  -0.011  -0.026***     
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)     
Years of schooling squared  0.003***  0.003***  0.004***     
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)     
Potential experience  0.025***  0.023***  0.021***  0.028**  0.025** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Potential experience squared  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Married  0.146***  0.141***  0.110***  0.068  0.060 
  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.091)  (0.090) 
Year dummy 2004  0.100***  0.112***  0.114***  0.143***  0.145*** 
  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Year dummy 2006  0.198***  0.211***  0.217***  0.282***  0.289*** 
  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
Constant  0.749***  1.062***  1.005***  1.563***  1.510*** 
  (0.071)  (0.074)  (0.070)  (0.251)  (0.248) 
           
Observations  4070  4070  4070  4070  4070 
R-squared  0.241  0.273  0.303  0.084  0.092 
Number of id        1955  1955 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  





Table A4. Pooled Quantile Earnings Regressions For All Workers 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
VARIABLES  Pooled .10  Pooled .25  Pooled .50  Pooled .75  Pooled .90  Pooled .10  Pooled .25  Pooled .50  Pooled .75  Pooled .90 
Informal Worker  -0.234***  -0.232***  -0.225***  -0.253***  -0.305***           
  (0.024)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.033)           
Informal Self-Emp.Worker             -0.134***  -0.069**  0.080***  0.190***  0.296*** 
            (0.039)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.036)  (0.042) 
Informal Wage Worker            -0.224***  -0.203***  -0.204***  -0.259***  -0.260*** 
            (0.029)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.037) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker            0.114**  0.298***  0.432***  0.582***  0.697*** 
            (0.055)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.042)  (0.047) 
Years of schooling  -0.043***  -0.042***  -0.029***  0.009  0.030**  -0.043***  -0.051***  -0.045***  -0.015**  -0.006 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.011) 
Years of schooling squared  0.005***  0.005***  0.004***  0.002***  0.001  0.005***  0.006***  0.005***  0.004***  0.003*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Potential experience  0.019***  0.026***  0.027***  0.026***  0.028***  0.020***  0.025***  0.025***  0.024***  0.027*** 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Potential experience squared  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female  -0.142***  -0.149***  -0.115***  -0.089***  -0.123***  -0.159***  -0.149***  -0.117***  -0.111***  -0.140*** 
  (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.020) 
Married  0.115***  0.101***  0.086***  0.145***  0.178***  0.102***  0.086***  0.068***  0.101***  0.129*** 
  (0.028)  (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.035)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.027) 
Year dummy 2004  0.099***  0.077***  0.100***  0.135***  0.156***  0.094***  0.080***  0.118***  0.129***  0.161*** 
  (0.024)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.026) 
Year dummy 2006  0.183***  0.181***  0.210***  0.235***  0.263***  0.180***  0.192***  0.226***  0.230***  0.250*** 
  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.034)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.028) 
Constant  0.597***  0.857***  1.077***  1.401***  1.758***  0.594***  0.873***  1.098***  1.291***  1.444*** 
  (0.078)  (0.059)  (0.058)  (0.062)  (0.115)  (0.074)  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.057)  (0.099) 
                     
Observations  9074  9074  9074  9074  9074  9074  9074  9074  9074  9074 
 
Bootstrapped standard errors (150 replications) are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 

















Table A5. Fixed Effects Quantile Earnings Regressions For All Workers 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
Vietnam VHLSS 2002-2004-2006 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
VARIABLES  FE .10  FE .25  FE .50  FE .75  FE .90  FE .10  FE .25  FE .50  FE .75  FE .90 
Informal Worker  -0.195***  -0.181***  -0.152***  -0.121***  -0.103***           
  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.010)  (0.015)           
Informal Self-Emp.Worker             0.022  0.072***  0.143***  0.221***  0.283*** 
            (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.005)  (0.015)  (0.020) 
Informal Wage Worker            -0.159***  -0.138***  -0.110***  -0.077***  -0.056*** 
            (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.017) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker            0.193***  0.262***  0.326***  0.395***  0.466*** 
            (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.005)  (0.021)  (0.027) 
Potential experience  0.031***  0.028***  0.027***  0.026***  0.024***  0.031***  0.027***  0.026***  0.025***  0.022*** 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Potential experience squared  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Married  0.028  0.028***  0.035***  0.042***  0.048***  0.018  0.027**  0.027***  0.033***  0.040** 
  (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.002)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.017) 
Year dummy 2004  0.184***  0.167***  0.147***  0.140***  0.131***  0.188***  0.165***  0.149***  0.141***  0.132*** 
  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.013) 
Year dummy 2006  0.320***  0.298***  0.290***  0.285***  0.292***  0.314***  0.296***  0.293***  0.291***  0.289*** 
  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.003)  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.015) 
Constant  1.185***  1.411***  1.584***  1.734***  1.962***  1.127***  1.339***  1.493***  1.646***  1.817*** 
  (0.030)  (0.025)  (0.004)  (0.026)  (0.030)  (0.035)  (0.024)  (0.006)  (0.026)  (0.032) 
                     
Observations  9074  9074  9074  9074  9074  9074  9074  9074  9074  9074 
 
Bootstrapped standard errors (150 replications) are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The regressions also include seven regional dummies and eight branch activity dummies.  
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Table A6. Pooled Quantile Earnings Regressions for Men  
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 




















                     
Informal Worker  -0.150***  -0.154***  -0.193***  -0.237***  -0.297***           
  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.047)           
Informal Self-Emp.Worker             -0.016  0.065  0.126***  0.173***  0.330*** 
            (0.047)  (0.045)  (0.039)  (0.045)  (0.051) 
Informal Wage Worker            -0.148***  -0.103***  -0.145***  -0.228***  -0.230*** 
            (0.038)  (0.035)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.040) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker            0.202**  0.368***  0.424***  0.599***  0.744*** 
            (0.087)  (0.053)  (0.055)  (0.059)  (0.053) 
Constant  0.475***  0.868***  1.039***  1.357***  1.624***  0.438***  0.828***  1.065***  1.301***  1.348*** 
  (0.090)  (0.081)  (0.076)  (0.084)  (0.153)  (0.085)  (0.091)  (0.071)  (0.072)  (0.125) 
                     
Observations  5004  5004  5004  5004  5004  5004  5004  5004  5004  5004 
 
Bootstrapped standard errors (150 replications) are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions also include 





Table A7. Pooled Quantile Earnings Regressions for Women  
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 




















                     
Informal Worker  -0.324***  -0.342***  -0.295***  -0.266***  -0.277***           
  (0.038)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.034)  (0.052)           
Informal Self-Emp.Worker             -0.275***  -0.175***  0.063  0.209***  0.364*** 
            (0.065)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.057) 
Informal Wage Worker            -0.388***  -0.359***  -0.322***  -0.320***  -0.227*** 
            (0.063)  (0.046)  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.054) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker            0.020  0.235***  0.415***  0.585***  0.736*** 
            (0.078)  (0.067)  (0.053)  (0.055)  (0.059) 
Constant  0.431***  0.663***  0.960***  1.428***  1.714***  0.480***  0.678***  1.045***  1.293***  1.346*** 
  (0.132)  (0.073)  (0.119)  (0.128)  (0.141)  (0.125)  (0.085)  (0.092)  (0.112)  (0.108) 
                     
Observations  4070  4070  4070  4070  4070  4070  4070  4070  4070  4070 
 
Bootstrapped standard errors (150 replications) are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions also include 
the set of control variables present in Tables A1 to A5 plus seven regional dummies and eight branch activity dummies. 
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Table A8. Fixed Effects Quantile Earnings Regressions for Men  
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
VARIABLES  FE .10  FE .25  FE .50  FE .75  FE .90  FE .10  FE .25  FE .50  FE .75  FE .90 
                     
Informal Worker  -0.132***  -0.129***  -0.109***  -0.087***  -0.073***           
  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.014)  (0.021)           
Informal Self-Emp.Worker             0.125***  0.138***  0.201***  0.265***  0.295*** 
            (0.027)  (0.018)  (0.008)  (0.021)  (0.025) 
Informal Wage Worker            -0.095***  -0.085***  -0.066***  -0.051***  -0.043* 
            (0.020)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.025) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker            0.246***  0.280***  0.345***  0.415***  0.463*** 
            (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.009)  (0.029)  (0.033) 
Constant  1.154***  1.444***  1.606***  1.766***  2.000***  1.084***  1.346***  1.501***  1.665***  1.879*** 
  (0.044)  (0.030)  (0.010)  (0.032)  (0.042)  (0.050)  (0.032)  (0.014)  (0.029)  (0.043) 
                     
Observations  5004  5004  5004  5004  5004  5004  5004  5004  5004  5004 
 
Bootstrapped standard errors (150 replications) are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions also include 







Table A9. Fixed Effects Quantile Earnings Regressions for Women  
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
VARIABLES  FE .10  FE .25  FE .50  FE .75  FE .90  FE .10  FE .25  FE .50  FE .75  FE .90 
                     
Informal Worker  -0.254***  -0.238***  -0.197***  -0.165***  -0.128***           
  (0.024)  (0.015)  (0.004)  (0.017)  (0.022)           
Informal Self-Emp.Worker             -0.103***  -0.034  0.045***  0.124***  0.225*** 
            (0.030)  (0.027)  (0.009)  (0.026)  (0.034) 
Informal Wage Worker            -0.259***  -0.232***  -0.176***  -0.126***  -0.089*** 
            (0.029)  (0.021)  (0.010)  (0.023)  (0.028) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker            0.107***  0.190***  0.253***  0.324***  0.442*** 
            (0.040)  (0.036)  (0.009)  (0.033)  (0.044) 
Constant  1.211***  1.403***  1.563***  1.718***  1.897***  1.166***  1.361***  1.508***  1.645***  1.791*** 
  (0.047)  (0.035)  (0.008)  (0.042)  (0.049)  (0.045)  (0.038)  (0.012)  (0.042)  (0.041) 
                     
Observations  4070  4070  4070  4070  4070  4070  4070  4070  4070  4070 
 
Bootstrapped standard errors (150 replications) are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions also include 
the set of control variables present in Tables A1 to A5 plus seven regional dummies and eight branch activity dummies.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 